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Abstract:  The empirical literature on finance and development suggests that countries 
with better developed financial systems experience faster economic growth.  Financial 
development - as captured by size, depth, efficiency and reach of financial systems- 
varies sharply around the world, with large differences among countries at similar levels 
of income.  This paper argues that governments play an important role in building 
effective financial systems and discusses different policy options to make finance work 
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What is the role of the financial sector in economic development?  Economists 
hold very different views.  On the one hand, prominent researchers believe that the 
operation of the financial sector merely responds to economic development, adjusting to 
changing demands from the real sector, and is therefore overemphasized (Robinson, 
1952; Lucas, 1988).  On the other hand, equally prominent researchers believe that 
financial systems play a crucial role in alleviating market frictions and hence influencing 
savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and therefore long-run 
growth rates.  (Schumpeter, 1912; Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 
1973; Miller 1998).
1 
Financial markets and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and 
transaction costs that prevent direct pooling and investment of society’s savings.
2  While 
some theoretical models stress the importance of different institutional forms financial 
systems can take, more important are the underlying functions that they perform (Levine, 
1997 and 2000; Merton and Bodie, 2004).  Financial systems help mobilize and pool 
savings, provide payments services that facilitate the exchange of goods and services, 
produce and process information about investors and investment projects to enable 
efficient allocation of funds, monitor investments and exert corporate governance after 
these funds are allocated, and help diversify, transform and manage risk. 
While still far from being conclusive, the bulk of the empirical literature on 
finance and development suggests that well-developed financial systems play an 
                                                 
1 Two famous quotes by Robinson and Schumpeter illustrate these different views. Joan Robinson (1952) 
argued “Where enterprise leads finance follows,” whereas Joseph Schumpeter observed “The banker, 
therefore, is not so much primarily a middleman…He authorizes people in the name of society …(to 
innovate).”   
2 See for example, Gurley and Shaw (1955), Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990),  Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion et al. (2004) among others.  
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independent and causal role in promoting long-run economic growth.  More recent 
evidence also points to the role of the sector in facilitating disproportionately rapid 
growth in the incomes of the poor, suggesting that financial development helps the poor 
catch up with the rest of the economy as it grows.  These research findings have been 
instrumental in persuading developing countries to sharpen their policy focus on the 
financial sector.  If finance is important for development, why do some countries have 
growth-promoting financial systems while others do not?  How do we define financial 
development? And what can governments do to develop their financial systems?       
This chapter addresses these questions.  The next section provides a brief review 
of the extensive empirical literature on finance and economic development and 
summarizes the main findings.  Section II illustrates the differences in financial systems 
around the world and discusses the role of legal, cultural, political and geographical 
factors in influencing financial development. Section III discusses the governments’ role 
in building effective financial systems.  Section IV provides areas of particular emphasis 
for lower-income countries.  Section V concludes.    
 
I.  Finance and Economic Development: Evidence 
By now there is an ever-expanding body of evidence that suggests countries with 
better developed financial systems – mostly captured by depth and efficiency measures- 
experience faster economic growth.
3  Cross-country studies show that better developed 
banks and markets are associated with faster growth and that this relationship is robust to 
controlling for reverse causality or potential omitted variables (King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998). These findings are also confirmed by panel and time-series 
                                                 
3 See Levine (1997 and 2005) for a comprehensive review of this literature.  
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estimation techniques (Levine, Loazya and Beck, 2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; 
Rousseau and Sylla, 1999).  Research also indicates that financial sector development 
helps economic growth through more efficient resource allocation and productivity 
growth rather than through the scale of investment or savings mobilization (Beck, Levine 
and Loayza, 2000).  Furthermore, cross-country time-series studies also show that 
financial liberalization boosts economic growth by improving allocation of resources and 
the investment rate (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001 and 2005). 
To further understand the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, researchers have also employed both firm-level and industry-level data 
across a broad cross-section of countries. These studies better address causality issues 
and seek to discover the mechanisms through which finance influences economic growth.     
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use firm level data and a financial 
planning model to show that more developed financial systems – as proxied by larger 
banking systems and more liquid stock markets- allow firms to grow faster than rates 
they can finance internally.  Consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), 
Love (2003) also uses firm level data and shows that the sensitivity of investment to 
internal funds is greater in countries in less developed financial systems.  Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) use firm level survey data for a broad set of 
countries and show that financial development eases the obstacles that firms face to 
growing faster, and that this effect is stronger particularly for smaller firms. Recent 
evidence also suggests that access to finance is associated with faster rates of innovation 
and firm dynamism consistent with the cross-country finding that finance promotes  
  4
growth through productivity increases (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2006).  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) use industry level data across countries and show that 
industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance – as measured by the finance-
intensity of U.S. industries
4 – benefit disproportionately more from greater financial 
development compared to other industries.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine 
(2006) again using industry data, highlight a distributional effect:  They find that 
industries that are naturally composed of small firms grow faster in financially developed 
economies, a result that provides additional evidence that financial development 
disproportionately promotes the growth of smaller firms.  Also using industry-level data, 
Wurgler (2000) shows that countries with higher levels of financial development increase 
investment more in growing industries and decrease investment more in declining 
industries, compared to countries with underdeveloped financial systems.      
There are also numerous individual country case studies that provide consistent 
evidence.  For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) compare states within the U.S. and 
show that bank branch reform boosted bank-lending quality and accelerated real per 
capita growth rates. Similarly, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) examine the 
individual regions of Italy.  They find that local financial development enhances the 
probability that an individual starts a business, increases industrial competition, and 
promotes growth of firms.  And these results are stronger for smaller firms which cannot 
easily raise funds outside of the local area. Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2004) provide 
firm-level evidence from France that shows the impact of 1985 deregulation eliminating 
                                                 
4 Chosen on the basis that the US financial system is relatively free of frictions, so each US industry’s use 
of external finance is a good proxy for its demand.  
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government intervention in bank lending decisions fostered greater competition in the 
credit market, inducing an increase in allocative efficiency across firms. 
Besides debates concerning the role of finance in economic development, 
economists have debated the relative importance of bank-based and market-based 
financial systems for a long time (Golsdmith, 1969; Boot and Thakor, 1997; Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001c).  However, research findings in this area 
have established that the debate matters much less than was previously thought, and that 
it is the financial services themselves that matter more than the form of their delivery   
(Levine, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2002).  
Financial structure does change during development, with financial systems becoming 
more market-based as the countries develop (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996 and 
2001b). But controlling for overall financial development, differences in financial 
structure per se do not help explain growth rates.  Nevertheless, these studies do not 
necessarily imply that institutional structure is unimportant for growth, rather that there is 
not one optimal institutional structure suitable for all countries at all times.  Growth-
promoting mixture of markets and intermediaries is likely to be determined by the legal, 
regulatory, political, policy and other factors that have not been adequately incorporated 
into the analysis or the indicators used in the literature may not sufficiently capture the 
comparative roles of banks and markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001a).    
Financial development has been shown to also play an important role in 
dampening the impact of external shocks on the domestic economy (Beck, Lundberg and 
Majnoni, 2006; Aghion, Banerjee and Manova, 2005; Raddatz, 2006), although financial 
crises do occur in developed and developing countries alike (Demirguc-Kunt and  
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Detragiache, 1998 and 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
5  Indeed, deeper financial 
systems without the necessary institutional development has been shown to lead to a poor 
handling or even magnification of risk rather than its mitigation, consistent with the 
findings of  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni 
(2006) and numerous country case studies discussed in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005).  
Another area of investigation where there has been recent empirical research is 
the impact of financial development on income distribution and poverty. Theory provides 
conflicting predictions in this area. Some theories argue that financial development 
should have a disproportionately beneficial impact on the poor since informational 
asymmetries produce credit constraints that are particularly binding on the poor.  Poor 
people find it particularly difficult to fund their own investments internally or externally 
since they lack resources, collateral and political connections to access finance (see for 
example, Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 
1997).  More generally, some political economy theories also suggest that better 
functioning financial systems make financial services available to a wider segment of the 
population, rather than restricting them to politically connected incumbents (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003; Morck, Wolfenzon and Young, 2005).  Yet others argue that financial 
access, especially to credit, only benefits the rich and the connected, particularly at early 
stages of economic development and therefore, while financial development may 
promote growth, its impact on income distribution is not clear (Lamoreaux, 1994; Haber, 
2004 and 2005).  Finally, if access to credit improves with aggregate economic growth 
and more people can afford to join the formal financial system, the relationship between 
                                                 
5 Also see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) for a review of the bank crisis literature.  
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financial development and income distribution may be non-linear, with adverse effects at 
early stages, but a positive impact after a certain point (Greenwood and Jovanovic,1990). 
In cross-country regressions, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) investigate 
how financial development influences the growth rate of Gini coefficient of income 
inequality, the growth rate of the income of the poorest quintile of society, and the 
fraction of the population living in poverty.  The results indicate that finance exerts a 
disproportionately large, positive impact on the poor and hence reduces income 
inequality. Investigating levels rather than growth rates, Honohan (2004) shows that even 
at the same average income, economies with deeper financial systems have fewer poor 
people.
6  Much more empirical research using micro datasets and different methodologies 
will be necessary to confirm these initial findings, and to better understand the 
mechanisms through which finance affects income distribution and poverty. 
Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence reviewed above suggests that countries 
with better developed financial systems grow faster and that this growth 
disproportionately benefits the poorer segments of the society.  Yet, financial system 
development differs widely across countries.  What makes some countries develop 
growth-promoting financial systems, while others cannot?  If finance is crucial for 
economic development, what can governments do to ensure well-functioning financial 
systems?  I turn to these questions next. 
 
                                                 
6 Also looking at levels, Clarke et al. (2003) provide further evidence that financial development is 
associated with lower levels of inequality.     
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II.  Financial Development: Indicators and Historical Determinants 
Financial development is a multifaceted concept and thus difficult to measure.  
Ideally, we would like indicators of how well each financial system fulfills its functions, 
i.e., identifies profitable projects, exerts corporate control, facilitates risk management, 
mobilizes savings, and eases transactions.  Unfortunately, since no such measures are 
available across countries, I will rely on commonly used measures of financial 
development to illustrate cross-country differences.  Table 1 reports summary statistics 
for indicators of financial depth, efficiency, access, size and openness by income level for 
over 150 countries.  
Private Credit, the value of credit by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP, and Stock Market Capitalization, the value of listed shares divided by 
GDP, are frequently used as measures of depth for the banking system and stock markets, 
respectively.  Private Credit captures the amount of credit channeled from savers, through 
financial intermediaries, to private firms.  Analysts use Stock Market Capitalization to 
indicate the ability to mobilize capital and diversify risk.  Both Private Credit and Market 
Capitalization increase with income (Figures 1a and 2a), although at similar levels of 
development there are still large differences (Figures 1b and 2b).
7  For example, while 
Thailand’s Private Credit is over 100 percent, at similar levels of GDP per capita, Peru 
only has a value of 23 percent.  Similarly, Malaysia’s Stock Market Capitalization is 140 
percent, Costa Rica, another upper middle income country has a ratio of 10 percent.   
                                                 
7 Also note that significant increases in financial depth not predicted by the underlying institutional 
improvements may signal trouble:  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) show that credit booms often 
lead to crises, and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) show that levels of banking and stock market 
development not predicted by legal efficiency and creditor rights protection do not promote firm growth.  
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The Net Interest Margin measures the gap between what the banks pay the 
providers of funds and what they get from firms and other users of bank credit and it 
equals interest income minus interest expense divided by interest bearing assets, averaged 
over the banks in each country.  It is frequently used to measure efficiency despite the 
fact that differences in net margins may reflect differences in bank activities rather than 
differences in efficiency or competition.  Net Interest Margin tends to decline with a 
country’s income, suggesting bank efficiency improves with development (Figure 3a).  
Unlike measures of depth, dispersion in efficiency figures tends to be higher at the lower 
end of the income distribution (Figure 3b and Table 1).   
While measures of financial depth and margins are available for a large set of 
countries, measures of the reach of the sector have been much more difficult to obtain 
across countries.  Until recently, we did not have answers to simple questions like what 
proportion of the population has a bank account or loan.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez Peria (2005) is the first study to develop cross-country measures of access to 
and use of banking services.  One of their indicators, Number of loans per capita, 
captures the use of credit services, with higher numbers indicating mode widespread use.  
Figure 4a shows that use of bank credit increases drastically with income.  But 
differences within income groups are also large:  while there are 770 bank loans per 1000 
people in Poland, there are only 94 in Venezuela (Figure 4b and Table 1).  Further 
research in this area is moving in the direction of developing better indicators of access to 
different financial services, using surveys both at the financial institution and household 
level.  
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Another interesting indicator is the size of the financial system.  For example 
measured by the Liquid Liabilities of the financial system (M2), about one third of all the 
countries have financial systems smaller than $1 billion, and another third have systems 
smaller than $10 billion (Figure 5b).  Leaving outliers like China or India aside, most 
developing countries have very small financial systems (Figure 5a).  This underlines the 
importance of domestic policy actions to maximize each country’s capacity to secure the 
best provision of financial services from the global marketplace. 
The last indicator, Freedom in Banking and Finance index, is a measure of 
openness of the banking industry. It is constructed by the Heritage Foundation and 
captures the extent of government involvement in the financial sector through ownership 
and control of financial institutions, quality of regulation and supervision, existence of 
interest controls, activity restrictions or directed lending, and the ability of foreign 
institutions to operate freely.  The index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher ratings indicating 
less openness and freedom.   Lower income countries allow their banks less freedom in 
general, compared to more developed countries.  But, for example comparing two 
low-income countries,  Cote d’Ivoire has a much more liberalized banking system with a 
score of 2.5, whereas in Uzbekistan government still has heavy involvement in the 
financial sector and allows no foreign entry, getting the highest possible score of 5 
(Figure 6a,b).    
The above analysis illustrates that financial systems vary widely with respect to 
all dimensions.  Even at similar levels of development, there are significant differences in 
their size, depth, efficiency, breath and openness.  Given the important role finance plays 
in promoting development, there is a growing body of research that examines  
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determinants of financial development.  One area of this line of research focuses on 
historical determinants of financial development and studies the legal, political, cultural, 
ethnic and geographic differences across countries that may shape development of 
financial institutions and markets. 
La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) stress that differences in legal traditions shape the 
laws and enforcement mechanisms that protect the rights of outside investors, thus 
influencing financial development. Focusing on the differences between the two most 
influential legal traditions, the British Common law and the French Civil law, this view 
holds that legal traditions differ in terms of the priority they attach to protecting the rights 
of private investors against the state.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003b and 
2005) also show that legal system adaptability is crucial and more flexible legal systems 
do a better job at meeting the continuously changing financial needs of the economy and 
promoting financial development.   
Haber (2004), Pagano and Volpin (2001), Rajan and Zingales (2003) focus on 
how political economy forces shape national policies toward financial development and 
influence and change the political power of entrenched incumbents. According to this 
view, closed political systems are more likely to impede the development of financial 
systems that promote competition and threaten entrenched powers than open political 
systems.  This is because centralized and powerful states are more responsive to and 
efficient at implementing policies that protect the interests of the elite than decentralized 
and competitive political systems with an assortment of checks and balances. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) emphasize the role of religion and culture in 
influencing development of institutions.  Many scholars argue that religion shapes  
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national views regarding institutions, including financial institutions.  For example, it is 
said that Catholic Church fosters “vertical bonds of authority” rather than “horizontal 
bonds of fellowship.”  This view suggests that Catholic and Muslim countries tend to 
develop cultures that maintain control, limiting competition and private property rights.  
Alesina et al. (2003) and Easterly and Levine (2003) focus on ethnic differences, instead.  
They argue that in highly ethnically diverse economies, the group that comes to power 
tends to implement policies that expropriate resources, restrict the rights of other groups, 
and prevent the growth of industries or sectors that threaten the ruling group.    
Others stress the role of initial geographic endowments in determining attitudes 
towards development of different institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001).  Acemoglu et al. (2001) focus on the disease environment 
and argue that the degree to which Europeans can settle in a land influenced the choice of 
colonization strategy with long lasting implications on institutions. Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) focus on the geographic endowments and study the differential 
development of institutions in North America.  They argue that the geographic conditions 
in the North which favored production of wheat and maize fostered a large middle class 
with egalitarian institutions, whereas the conditions in the South which led to the 
production of rice and sugarcane also led to the rise of a powerful elite and more closed 
institutions.  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a) investigate the relative importance of 
these historical determinants of financial development and find that differences in initial 
endowments and legal origins are robustly associated with development of financial 
institutions and markets.  Thus, countries with common law origins with better protection  
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of outside investors were more likely to develop financial institutions. But colonization 
strategy also mattered: Tropical environments, inhospitable to European settlement, were 
more likely to foster extractive institutions as opposed to institutions that promote 
financial development.
8    
Perhaps most important from a policy viewpoint however, is the government’s 
role in building effective financial systems.  In the next section, I review the role of 
regulations and economic policies in influencing financial development. 
 
III.  Government’s Role in Making Finance Work 
Although finance thrives on market discipline and fails to contribute to 
development process effectively in the presence of interventionist policies, governments 
do have a very important role to play in promoting well-functioning financial systems. 
Specifically, governments can help greatly through providing a stable political and 
macroeconomic environment, fiscal discipline and good governance; well-functioning 
legal and information infrastructure; and strong regulation and supervision that enable 
greater market monitoring without distorting the incentives of market participants.  
Governments can also improve the contestability and efficiency of financial systems by 
avoiding ownership of financial institutions, and liberalizing their systems including 
allowing foreign entry.  Government policies can also help in efforts to facilitate broad 
access to financial services.  Below, I discuss each of these areas and, where applicable, 
pros and cons of different policies. 
 
                                                 
8 Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006a, b) instead focus on property rights protection and  
show that legal origin is not a robust determinant whereas ethnic fractionalization is.  
  14
IIIa.  Political and Macroeconomic Environment 
Even if historical factors are favorable to financial development, political turmoil 
may lead to macroeconomic instability and deterioration in business conditions. Civil 
strife and war destroys capital and infrastructure, and expropriations may follow military 
takeovers.  Corruption and crime thrive in such environments, increasing cost of doing 
business and creating uncertainty about property rights.  Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel 
(2005) show that for low-income countries political instability and corruption have a 
detrimental effect on financial development.  Investigating the business environment for 
80 countries using firm level survey data, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2005) find that political instability and crime are important obstacles to firm growth, 
particularly in African and Transition countries.  Further, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2005) show that the negative impact of corruption on firm growth is  most 
pronounced for smaller firms.   
Given a stable political system, well functioning financial systems also require 
fiscal discipline and stable macroeconomic policies on the part of governments.  
Monetary and fiscal policies affect the taxation of financial intermediaries and provision 
of financial services (Bencivenga and Smith, 1992; Huybens and Smith, 1999; Roubini 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  Often large financing 
requirements of governments crowd out private investment by increasing the required 
returns on government securities and absorbing the bulk of the savings mobilized by the 
financial system. Bank profitability does not necessarily suffer given the high yields on 
these securities, but the ability of the financial system to allocate resources efficiently is 
severely curtailed.  Empirical studies have also shown that countries with lower and more  
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stable inflation rates experience higher levels of banking and stock market development 
(Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001) and high inflation and real interest rates are associated 
with higher probability of systemic banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998 and 2005).   
IIIb.  Legal and Information Infrastructure 
Financial systems also require developed legal and information infrastructures to 
function well.    Firms’ ability to raise external finance in the formal financial system is 
quite limited if the rights of outside investors are not protected. Outside investors are 
reluctant to invest in companies if they will not be able to exert corporate governance and 
protect their investment from controlling shareholders/owners or the management of the 
companies.  Thus, protection of property rights and effective enforcement of contracts are 
critical elements in financial system development.   
Empirical evidence shows firms are able to access external finance in countries 
where legal enforcement is stronger (La Porta et al., 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005), and that  better 
creditor protection increases credit to the private sector (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 
2005).  More effective legal systems allow more flexible and adaptable conflict 
resolution, increasing firms’ access to finance (Djankov et al., 2003;  Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 2005).  In countries where legal systems are more effective, financial 
systems have lower interest rate spreads and are more efficient (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven 
and Levine, 2004; Laeven and Majnoni, 2005).    
Timely availability of good quality information is equally important, since this 
helps reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. The collection,  
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processing and use of borrowing history and other information relevant to household and 
small business lending – credit registries - have been rapidly growing in both the public 
and private sectors (see Miller, 2003, for an overview).  Computer technology has also 
greatly improved the amount of information that can be analyzed to assess 
creditworthiness, such as through credit scoring techniques.  Governments can play an 
important role in this process, and while establishment of public credit registries may 
discourage private entry, in several cases it has actually encouraged private registries to 
enter in order to provide a wider and deeper range of services. Governments are also 
important in creating and supporting the legal system needed for conflict resolution and 
contract enforcement, and strengthening accounting infrastructures to enable financial 
development. 
Empirical results show that the volume of bank credit is significantly higher in 
countries with more information sharing (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; and Djankov, 
McLeish and Shleifer, 2005).  Firms also report lower financing obstacles with better 
credit information (Love and Mylenko, 2003).  Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) 
find that better access to information and speedier enforcement of contracts are associated 
with deeper financial systems even in low-income countries.  Indeed, compared to high 
income countries, in lower income countries it is credit information more than legal 
enforcement that matters (Djankov et al., 2005). 
IIIc.  Regulation and Supervision 
For as long as there have been banks, there have also been governments 
regulating them.  While most economists agree that there is a role for government in the 
regulation and supervision of financial systems, the extent of this involvement is an issue  
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of active debate (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006; Beck, 2006).  One extreme view is the 
laissez-faire or invisible-hand approach, where there is no role for government in the 
financial system, and markets are expected to monitor and discipline financial 
institutions.  This approach has been criticized for ignoring market failures as depositors, 
particularly small depositors, often find it too costly to be effective monitors.
9  Thus, 
governments often act as delegated monitors for depositors, exploiting economies of 
scale to overcome costly information problems. 
On the other extreme is the complete interventionist approach, where government 
regulation is seen as the solution to market failures (Stigler, 1971).  According to this 
view, powerful supervisors are expected to ensure stability of the financial system and 
guide banks in their business decisions through regulation and supervision.  This view 
relies on two crucial assumptions.  First, that governments know better than markets, and 
second, that they act in the best interests of the society.  To the extent that officials 
generally have limited knowledge and expertise in making business decisions and can be 
subject to political and regulatory capture, these assumptions will not be valid (Becker 
and Stigler, 1974; Haber et al. 2003).     
Between the two extremes lies the private empowerment view of financial 
regulation. This view simultaneously recognizes the potential importance of market 
failures which motivate government intervention, and political/regulatory failures, which 
suggest that supervisory agencies do not necessarily have incentives to ease market 
failures. The focus is on enabling markets, where there is an important role for 
                                                 
9 Small depositors have to be protected, but banks also need to be protected against runs by uninformed 
depositors that may precipitate forced liquidations.  Further, market imperfections may also prevent optimal 
resource allocation, as powerful banks may extract rents from firms, reducing their incentives to undertake 
profitable investments.  See Levine (2005) for further discussion.  
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governments in enhancing the ability and incentives of private agents to overcome 
information and transaction costs, so that private investors can exert effective governance 
over banks.  Consequently, the private empowerment view seeks to provide supervisors 
with the responsibility and authority to induce banks to disclose accurate information to 
the public, so that private agents can more effectively monitor banks (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine, 2006).   
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the private empowerment view.  
While there is little evidence that empowering regulators enhances bank stability, there is 
evidence that regulations and supervisory practices that force accurate information 
disclosure and promote private sector monitoring boost the overall level of banking sector 
and stock market development (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006).   
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) show that bank supervisory practices 
that force accurate information disclosure ease external financing constraints of firms, 
while countries that empower their official supervisors actually make external financing 
constraints more severe by increasing the degree of corruption in bank lending.
10 
Consistent with these findings, Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2006) 
investigate compliance with Basel Core Principles of regulation and supervision and 
show that only information disclosure rules have a significant impact on bank soundness.  
Finally, Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) find little significant impact of regulatory 
and supervisory practices on financial development of low-income countries.  Where 
                                                 
10 La Porta et al. (2006) find a similarly positive effect of private monitoring and disciplining for stock 
market development.  Laws and liability rules that mandate disclosure and facilitate private enforcement 
promote stock market development, while there is little evidence for a positive effect of public 
enforcement.    
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there is significance, greater supervisory powers seem to be negatively associated with 
financial depth. 
Related to the debate on different approaches for regulation and supervision, is 
the important debate on whether prudential regulation and safety nets designed for 
developed countries can be successfully transplanted to developing countries.  Research 
shows that financial sector policy which is considered appropriate in advanced economies 
can prove ineffective or even counterproductive in weak institutional environments of 
developing countries.  For example, powerful regulators are not significantly associated 
with increased corruption in banking in countries with strong institutions that provide 
checks and balances, but lead to greater capture and corruption in lower-income 
countries.  However, although empowering the markets and focusing on information 
disclosure are policies that promote bank stability most effectively in countries where 
there is strong rule of law, we do not observe negative effects of such policies even in 
low-income countries (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006).
11   For developing 
countries, these results have important implications for which aspects of the Basel II 
accord (which was designed for and by regulators in advanced economies) to adopt and 
over what time period.  In particular, the complicated rules and procedures for 
determining bank capital adequacy pre-suppose expertise and governance conditions 
which simply do not exist in most low-income countries. 
Similarly, research has questioned safety net design, particularly adoption of 
deposit insurance in developing countries by highlighting the potential costs of explicit 
schemes –lower market discipline, higher financial fragility, and lower financial 
                                                 
11 Consistent with these results, Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2006) show that compliance 
with the information disclosure rules of Basel Core Principles promotes bank stability where there is strong 
rule of law.   
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development – in countries where complementary institutions are not strong enough to 
keep these costs under control (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Cull, Senbet and Sorge, 2005).  
These findings are particularly important for lower income countries with 
underdeveloped institutions.  For example, Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) also 
find that presence of an explicit deposit insurance system does not lead to more deposit 
mobilization in low-income countries; to the contrary it is associated with lower levels of 
deposits.
12 
IIId.  Contestability and Efficiency 
Policymakers around the world frequently express concern about whether their 
countries’ bank competition policies are appropriately designed to produce well-
functioning and stable banks.  Globalization and the resulting consolidation in banking 
have further spurred interest in this issue, leading to an active public policy debate. 
Competition policies in banking may involve difficult trade-offs.  While greater 
competition may enhance the efficiency of banks with positive implications for economic 
growth, greater competition may also destabilize banks with costly repercussions for the 
economy. 
Recent research has shown that contrary to conventional wisdom, there are no 
difficult trade-offs when it comes to bank competition.  Greater competition – as captured 
by lower entry barriers, fewer regulatory restrictions on bank activities, greater banking 
freedom, and better overall institutional development – is good for efficiency, good for 
                                                 
12 Using a sample of developed and developing countries, Cecchetti and Krause (2004) also find that 
explicit deposit insurance results in less credit provision to the private sector.  
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stability, and good for firms’ access to finance (Berger et al., 2004).
13  Indeed, regulations 
that interfere with competition make banks less efficient, more fragile, and reduce firms’ 
access to finance.  Thus, it is a good idea for governments to encourage competition in 
banking by reducing the unnecessary impediments to entry and activity restrictions.  
Similarly, improving the institutional environment and allowing greater freedoms in 
banking and economy in general would lead to desirable outcomes.   
Ownership is another important dimension of competition in banking. As I 
discuss further in sections IIIe and f, research shows that while foreign banking is 
associated with generally positive outcomes, state ownership is associated with higher 
margins, greater fragility and less access.   These results highlight the importance of 
removing impediments to foreign entry and provide further justification for bank 
privatization policies.  Finally, bank concentration, which has been the focus of much 
policy discussion, is not a good proxy for the overall competitive environment per se and 
its impact often depends on the existing regulatory and institutional framework.  Hence 
governments would do better to focus on improving the underlying regulatory and 
institutional environment (as discussed in sections IIIb and c) and ownership structure to 
promote contestable financial systems, rather than trying to reduce concentration levels in 
banking.    
IIIe.  Government Ownership of Financial Institutions 
Policymakers in many countries have felt the need to retain public ownership of 
banks.  However, research has shown that government ownership of banks everywhere, 
but especially in developing countries, lead to lower levels of financial development, 
                                                 
13 Also see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006), 
Claessens and Laeven (2004), and Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004).  
  22
more concentrated lending and lower economic growth, and greater systemic fragility (La 
Porta et al., 2002; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004).  The inefficient allocation of credit 
by state-owned banks to politically-favored and commercially unviable projects 
frequently necessitates costly recapitalizations (Cole, 2005; Dinc, 2005).  Thus, empirical 
evidence shows that the ownership of financial firms is an area where the public sector 
tends not to have a comparative advantage; such ownership weakens the financial system 
and the economy.   
However, privatization also entails risks and needs careful design. Studies of 
privatization processes suggest the preferred strategy is moving slowly but deliberately 
with bank privatization, while preparing state banks for sale and addressing weaknesses 
in the overall incentive environment.  On average, bank privatization tends to improve 
performance over continued state ownership, and there are advantages to full rather than 
partial privatizations, and in weak institutional environments selling to a strategic 
investor and inviting foreign interests to participate in the process increase the benefits 
(see Clarke, Cull, Shirley, 2005). Privatization, however, is not a panacea, and privatizing 
banks without addressing weaknesses in the underlying incentive environment and 
market structure will not lead to a deeper and more efficient financial system.    
IIIf.  Financial Liberalization  
As illustrated above, in comparison with the scale of global finance, financial 
systems in individual developing countries are often very small.  Small financial systems 
underperform because they suffer from concentration of risks, cannot exploit economies 
of scale and are thus more vulnerable to external shocks (Bossone, Honohan and Long,  
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2001).  Theoretically, these countries fall short of minimum efficient scale and have 
much to gain by liberalizing and sourcing some of their financial services from abroad. 
There is a very large literature on macroeconomic and international financial 
issues which are outside the scope of this paper.  In this section I limit my discussion to 
(a) the impact of financial liberalization on financial development and the importance of 
sequencing liberalization and institutional reforms; (b) the impact of exchange rate 
regime on financial fragility; and the impact of (c) foreign entry and (d)  international 
capital flows on financial development.  
Financial liberalization, financial development and the sequencing of reforms. 
Many countries have liberalized their financial systems in the 1980s and 1990s with 
mixed results.  Liberalization, including deregulation of interest rates and more relaxed 
entry policies, often led to significant financial development, particularly in countries 
where there was significant repression, but the enthusiasm with which financial 
liberalization was adopted in some countries in the absence of or slow implementation of 
institutional development also left many financial systems vulnerable to systemic crises 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).  Poor sequencing of financial liberalization in a 
poorly prepared contractual and supervisory environment contributed to bank 
insolvencies as banks protected by implicit and explicit government guarantees 
aggressively took advantage of new opportunities to increase risk, without the necessary 
lending skills.  Banking crises in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Turkey in the 1980s and 
1990s have been attributed to these factors (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005).   
On the other hand, many Sub-Saharan African countries that have also liberalized 
their interest rates and credit allocation and privatized their institutions by allowing entry  
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of reputable foreign banks did not suffer instability but from lower intermediation and in 
some cases lower access to financial services.  Some of this was due to the absence of an 
effective contractual and informational framework (See Beck and Fuchs, 2004).  This has 
also resulted in claims of failed liberalizations in these countries and calls for greater 
government intervention in the financial sector.
14  Both of these experiences with 
financial liberalization underline the importance of sequencing liberalization and 
institutional improvements. 
Impact of exchange rate policy on financial fragility.   The choice of an 
appropriate exchange rate regime for developing countries is another issue of active 
debate.
15  One of the reasons this is an important issue is because the choice of exchange 
rate regime may influence the extent to which the impact of external shocks affect 
financial stability.  For instance, flexible exchange rates may have a stabilizing effect on 
the financial system since the exchange rate can absorb some of the real shocks to the 
economy (Mundell, 1961).  Flexible regimes may also curtail the tendency of countries to 
over-borrow in foreign currency and discourage banks from funding dangerous lending 
booms through external credit (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999).  Further, with a fixed 
exchange rate (and even more so with a currency board), lender of last resort operations 
are severely limited, since domestic monetary expansion risks undermining confidence in 
the currency peg. 
On the other hand, a commitment to a currency peg may reduce the probability of 
banking crises by disciplining policymakers (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998).  The lack of 
an effective lender of last resort may also discourage risk-taking by bankers, decreasing 
                                                 
14 However, after a slow start, credit growth is accelerating across Africa, and there has also been a catch-
up in access, often through growth of cooperatives and other microfinance institutions. 
15 See Yagci (2006) in this volume for an extensive discussion.  
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the likelihood of a banking crisis.  Finally, developing countries are often plagued by lack 
of credibility and limited access to international markets, and suffer from more 
pronounced effects of exchange rate volatility due to their high liability dollarization.  
Thus, the additional transparency and credibility associated with fixed exchange rates 
may insulate a country from contagion (Calvo, 1999).    
Empirically, Arteta and Eichengreen (2002) find that countries with fixed and 
flexible exchange rates are equally susceptible to banking crises.  In contrast, Domac and 
Martinez Peria (2003) find that adopting a fixed exchange rate regime diminishes the 
likelihood of a banking crisis in developing countries. However, once a crisis occurs, its 
economic cost is larger under a fixed exchange rate.   
Studies on the impact of dollarization on financial fragility similarly reveal mixed 
evidence. Dollarization is a symptom of weak domestic currencies and volatile real 
exchange rates and thus may be associated with fragility.  Arteta (2003) investigates the 
impact of deposit and credit dollarization for a large number of developing and transition 
countries and finds no evidence that dollarization increases fragility.  De Nicolo, 
Honohan and Ize (2003) perform a similar test but measure fragility using average Z-
scores (measuring the distance to default for the banking system, which is different from 
the actual occurrence of a systemic crisis) and non-performing loans across a large 
number of countries. In contrast to Arteta’s results, they find that dollarization is 
positively related to both measures of bank fragility. More research is needed in these 
areas to guide the on-going policy discussion on the impact of exchange rate policies.  
Impact of foreign entry. With financial liberalization, more and more developing 
economies also allow entry of foreign financial institutions.  While governments have  
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worried about whether allowing foreign banks to take a large ownership share in the 
banking system could damage financial and economic performance, the bulk of the 
empirical research in this area, particularly drawing on the experience of Latin American 
and Eastern European countries, suggests that facilitating entry of reputable foreign 
institutions to the local market should be welcomed.  Foreign banks bring competition, 
improve efficiency, lift the quality of the financial infrastructure and expand access 
(Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria, 
2001).
16 
As the African experience illustrates, foreign bank entry cannot guarantee rapid 
financial development in the absence of sound contractual and informational weaknesses, 
however.  Such weaknesses can prevent low-income countries from reaping full benefits 
of opening their markets to foreign providers of financial services, and can potentially 
explain the finding that greater foreign bank penetration is associated with lower levels of 
financial development (Detragiache, Tressel, Gupta, 2006).
17  However, addressing these 
weaknesses is likely to allow foreign banks to act as an important catalyst for the sort of 
financial development that promotes growth.  
Impact of international capital flows.   While there is consensus that liberalizing 
financial systems facilitates their development, there are also concerns that this leaves 
                                                 
16 While in some countries like Pakistan, foreign banks have been shown to lend less to smaller more 
opaque borrowers because they rely on hard information (Mian, 2003), evidence from Eastern Europe  has 
shown that foreign banks eventually go down market increasing small business lending (De Haas and 
Naaborg, 2005).  This is consistent with recent research that shows as new transaction-based lending 
techniques have been developed, where large foreign institutions have greater advantage, relationship 
lending, thus small, domestic institutions have become less important for SME lending (Berger and Udell, 
2006).   
17 Another explanation why cross-country correlations between foreign bank penetration and financial 
development may be negative in low-income countries is that in most of those countries foreign bank entry 
was through privatization of failed government banks.  
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them more open to volatility and crises.
18 As discussed above, one way of containing 
such volatility is stronger fundamentals, hence proper sequencing of reforms.
19 Policy 
discussion has also focused on proper design of capital controls, which could prevent or 
mitigate the effects of sudden shifts in foreign capital.  Controls can take the form of 
restrictions on outflows; restrictions on aggregate inflows; restrictions on short-term 
flows (a la Chile); or a Tobin tax, aimed at imposing a small uniform tax on all foreign 
exchange transactions, regardless of their nature.    
There is a large literature on the effects of capital controls, but overall, these 
empirical studies suggest that these controls work at best temporarily, with the effects 
diminishing over time, and are not effective in preventing spillovers from very large 
shocks (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001). 
Besides debt and equity flows, workers’ remittances, funds received from 
migrants working abroad, have grown steadily in recent years becoming the second 
largest source of external finance after foreign direct investment.  Furthermore, unlike 
other capital flows, remittances tend to be stable even during periods of economic 
downturns and crises.  Recent research also provides evidence that remittances do 
promote financial development (Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2006).  
Other studies emphasize the importance of financial development in allowing countries to 
make the most out of capital flows.  For example, Hermes and Lensink (2003) show that 
                                                 
18 Opening up allows firms to raise resources abroad but Levine and Schmukler (2005) show that it may 
also reduce the trading activity of these firms on domestic stock exchanges, negatively affecting the 
liquidity of other firms that do not go abroad.  However, Ferreira and Matos (2005) show that with 
increased cross-listing, foreign ownership of shares traded on the local exchanges also increase. 
19 Note that studies suggest volatility tends to decrease in the long run, with more integrated markets having 
lower volatility due to better diversification and development of the financial sector (Bekaert and Harvey, 
2003).  However, liberalization does also increase the probability of crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1999).  
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a more developed financial system positively contributes to the process of technological 
diffusion associated with foreign direct investment.  
IIIg.   Facilitating Access  
Access to financial services has increasingly been receiving greater emphasis over 
the recent years, becoming a focal part of the overall development agenda.  One reason is 
the accumulating evidence on the importance of finance for growth, and the belief that 
limited access to finance is a contributor to not being able to escape poverty.  Another is 
the observation that small enterprises and poor households face much greater obstacles in 
their ability to access finance all around the world, but particularly in developing 
countries. 
What does access to finance mean?  There are many dimensions of access, 
including availability, cost, and range and quality of services being offered.  Morduch 
(1999) defines these dimensions as (a) reliability, whether finance is available when it is 
needed or desired; (b) convenience, how easy it is to access finance; (c) continuity, ability 
to access finance repeatedly; and (d) flexibility, whether the product is tailored to the 
needs of the household or enterprise.   
While there is much data on financial sector development more broadly, there is 
very little data on usage and access to finance, both for households and firms.  Hence, 
there is also very limited analysis on the impact of access to finance on economic 
development.  Research using firm level survey data suggests that financing obstacles are 
the most constraining among different barriers to growth (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2005).  Financing obstacles are also found to be highest and most 
constraining for the growth of smaller firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic,  
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2005).  At the household level, lack of access to credit is shown to perpetuate poverty 
because poor households reduce their children’s education (Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby and 
Skoufias, 1997).  Similarly, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) find that child labor rates are higher 
in countries with under-developed financial systems, while Beegle et al. (2003) show that 
transitory income shocks to greater increases in child labor in countries with poorly 
functioning financial systems.  A better understanding of what the chief obstacles to 
improving access are, and access to which type of financial services has the greater 
impact on reducing poverty and promoting growth, will need to wait for availability of 
better data in this area. 
There are many different reasons why the poor do not have access to finance –
loans, savings accounts, insurance services.  Social and physical distance from the formal 
financial system may matter.  The poor may not have anybody in their social network 
who knows the various services that are available to them.  Lack of education may make 
it difficult for them to overcome problems with filling out loan applications, and the 
small number of transactions they are likely to undertake may make the loan officers 
think it is not worthwhile to help them.  As financial institutions are likely to be in richer 
neighborhoods, physical distance may also matter, banks simply may not be near the poor 
(Beck and De la Torre, 2006).  Specifically for access to credit services, there are two 
important problems.  First, the poor have no collateral, and cannot borrow against their 
future income because they tend not to have steady jobs or income streams to keep track 
of.  Second, dealing with small transactions is costly for the financial institutions. 
Ceilings on the rates financial institutions can charge backfire and limit access to the poor 
even more.  
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Microfinance –specialized institutions that serve the poor - tries to overcome 
these problems in innovative ways.  Loan officers come from similar social status as the 
borrowers and go to the poor instead of waiting for the poor to come to them.  
Microcredit also involves education as much as it provides credit.  Group lending 
schemes not only improve repayment incentives and monitoring through peer pressure, 
but they are also a way of building support networks and educating borrowers.   
Has microfinance fulfilled its promise?  Microfinance allows poor people to have 
more direct access, but development of microfinance around the world has been very 
non-uniform, with significant penetration rates only in a few countries like Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Thailand (Honohan, 2004).  Group lending is very costly since labor cost 
per dollar of transactions needs to be high by design.  The most controversial aspect of 
microfinance, however, has been the extent of subsidy required to provide this access.  
Overall, the microfinance sector remains heavily grant and subsidy dependent.  Skeptics 
question whether microfinance is the best way to provide those subsidies and point out 
that development of mainstream finance is a more promising way to reach the poor and 
alleviate poverty in significant ways.   
There are also good political economy reasons why we should not focus on the 
poor and ask how we can make microfinance more viable, but instead ask how financial 
services can be made available for all (Rajan, 2006).
20  The poor lack the political clout to 
demand better services, and subsidies may spoil the credit culture.  By defining the issue 
more broadly to include the middle class who often also lack access, would make it more 
likely that promotion of financial assess will be made a priority.   
                                                 
20 Rajan (2006) argues “…let’s not kill the microfinance movement with kindness.  If we want it to become 
more than a fad…it has to follow the clear and unsentimental path of adding value and making money.  On 
that path lies the possibility of a true, and large-scale escape from poverty.”   
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What can governments do to promote access?  First and foremost, governments 
can further access by making and encouraging infrastructure improvements.  Better legal, 
information, payments systems, distribution and other structures can allow technology to 
bring down transaction costs.  Research shows that small firms and firms in countries 
with poor institutions use less external finance, especially less bank finance, and that 
other types of finance are imperfect substitutes (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2005).  For example, at the household level, giving each individual a national 
identification number and creating credit registries where lenders share information about 
their clients’ repayment records would help since all borrowers could then borrow using 
their future access to credit as collateral (Rajan, 2006).  
Government regulation can also help.  Removal of interest ceilings, or usury laws, 
would allow institutions to charge the rates that they need to be profitable and improve 
access.  These regulations end up hurting the very poor they are trying to protect as the 
supply of these services completely dry up.  Anti-predatory lending or truth in lending 
requirements is also very important since households may also be forced into over-
borrowing by unscrupulous lenders.  Reducing costs of registering and repossessing 
collateral is crucial.  In Brazil for example, inability to repossess property has contributed 
to the cost of the housing finance program, keeping the mortgage rates too high to be 
affordable for the poor. Anti-discrimination policies may also help against cases of active 
or passive discrimination against the poor or different ethnic groups.       
Financial regulations can also prevent the emergence of institutions better suited  
to the needs of lower income households or smaller firms.  Rigid chartering rules, high 
capital adequacy requirements, very strict accounting requirements may reduce the ability  
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of institutions to serve the poorer segments of the society.  As many households are 
interested in savings services but not in credit services, considering and regulating 
savings mobilization separately from credit services may be helpful (Claessens, 2005). 
For example in South Africa, extension of bank regulation and supervision to 
microfinance institutions reduced their capacity to offer their services profitably 
(Glaessner et al. 2004).   
Governments can also be instrumental in facilitating innovative technologies to 
improve access.  For example in Mexico, a program developed by Nafin, a government 
development bank, allows many small suppliers to use their receivables from large credit-
worthy buyers to receive working capital financing (Klapper, 2006).  This type of trade 
finance is called reverse factoring and effectively allows small firms to borrow based on 
the creditworthiness of their buyers, allowing them to borrow more at cheaper rates.
21  
Governments can also opt to stimulate access more directly.  The US Treasury’s 
Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETAs) to increase use of bank accounts, US Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) to improve access to credit services, legal measures adopted by 
the UK, France, Sweden, and Ireland among others, are such examples.  However, there 
is little consensus on the success of those schemes (Peachey and Roe, 2004; Claessens, 
2005) and whether they can be replicated in developing countries.  The experiences with 
credit extensions, especially to improve the maturity structure of debt and reach the 
SMEs, are extensive in both developed and developing countries.  However, both the 
rationale for and effectiveness of those interventions are much more doubtful (see Caprio 
and Demirguc-Kunt, 1997; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). 
                                                 
21 Also see Berger and Udell (2006) for a discussion of different innovative technologies that can expand 
access of small firms even in the absence of a strong institutional environment.  De la Torre and Schmukler 
(2005) includes other such public-private partnership examples of expanding access.  
  33
Last but perhaps most importantly, governments can improve access by 
increasing competition in the financial sector.  As financial institutions find their 
traditional business coming under competition, they seek out new lines of profitable 
opportunities, including lending to the SMEs and the poor.  Given the right incentives, 
private sector can develop and make use of new technologies – like credit scoring – to 
reach the underserved segments.  Foreign banks’ role in improving the competition 
environment and improving access is important.  There is accumulating evidence that 
foreign banks can enhance access (Clarke et al, 2001 and 2003).
22  Indeed, multinational 
banks have been leading the way in expanding access all around the world.
23     
 
IV.  Challenges for Low-Income Countries  
Should all countries follow these recommendations?  While the general messages 
will not be dissimilar, the directions in which financial sector needs improvement in 
different countries will be based on their initial conditions (World Bank, 2001).  These 
reforms are the most challenging for low-income countries, where the legacy of financial 
repression and state ownership has generally hampered the development of a vigorous 
private financial system, where the underlying legal and information infrastructure is 
weak, and achieving minimum efficient scale will be difficult.  Supported by stable and 
sustainable macro policies, a priority for the state would be to divest itself of bank 
holdings and attract reputable international banks.  If democracy is weak and ethnic 
conflict is high, a significant level of uncertainty will prevail, which will likely deter 
                                                 
22 Also see the country examples discussed in Claessens (2005). 
23 Studies have found that while foreign banks with small local presence do not appear to lend much to 
small businesses, large foreign banks in many cases surpass large domestic banks.  See for example, 
Sanchez et al. 2006.  
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entry by good foreign banks.  Low population density is another factor that may deter 
entry.   
Legal and informational infrastructures are likely to be weak, and will need to be 
strengthened if financial systems are to function well.  Transport and communications 
infrastructures are also essential for financial development.  In financial regulation, 
political capture and corruption will potentially be an issue, so transparency, 
independence and accountability will be important.  Although markets are likely to be 
underdeveloped and the rule of law weak, encouraging and empowering the market to 
participate in monitoring through education and disclosure will have longer-term 
pay-offs.  The temptation to extend government guarantees – in the form of deposit 
insurance – to bolster confidence in the formal financial system should be resisted, as it 
has been shown to create moral hazard and backfire.  The country is likely to be too small 
and too poor to sustain a liquid securities market, so this is an area of reform best left till 
after other priorities are addressed.   Reducing bank concentration is not a worthy goal in 
itself either, the focus of policy should be improving contestability instead – through 
lower entry barriers, fewer restrictions on bank activities and freedoms.  Improving 
competition in this way, coupled with institutional reforms, should increase the 
availability and lower the cost of credit to enterprises with good growth opportunities. 
Governments would do well to remove barriers that prevent borrowers and 
lenders from accessing international capital markets, as institutional improvements are 
made.  While this will increase volatility at least in the short run, it will also lead to 
significant benefits in terms of overall financial development.  If the country is small, 
exploring possibilities for regional cooperation may be fruitful in improving access to  
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higher quality financial services.  Technological advances, facilitated by greater 
competition and entry of foreign know-how, can lead to promising innovations in the 
areas of deposits, payments, credit, and risk management, making basic financial services 
available to poor households and small firms.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
A well-functioning financial system is one of the key foundations on which 
sustained economic development can be built.  Research suggests that financial sector 
development plays an independent and causal role in promoting long-run economic 
growth. More recent evidence has also shown that finance is not only pro-growth, but 
also pro-poor:  Well developed financial systems are associated with more rapid growth 
in the incomes of the poor, helping them catch up with the rest of the economy as it 
grows. 
Yet, financial development differs sharply around the world.  Even at similar 
levels of income, countries have very different levels of financial development.  If 
finance is a key driver of economic development, what can governments do to promote 
financial development? Research so far suggests a number of important policy 
recommendations.  First and foremost, well functioning financial systems need stable 
macroeconomic policies and strong legal and information systems.  Making infrastructure 
improvements a priority is a must.  Second, promoting a contestable financial sector – as 
characterized by lower entry barriers, fewer regulatory restrictions on bank activities, 
greater banking freedoms -is essential for improving depth, efficiency and access.  This 
means reducing government ownership through careful privatization, and domestic and  
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international liberalization including foreign entry.  Opening up is also accompanied by 
risks however, particularly a higher risk of financial crisis, and therefore needs to be 
synchronized with improvements in institutional improvements. 
Third, governments have an important role to play as regulators.  But empirical 
evidence suggests the best approach to regulation is one which empowers the markets, 
rather than creating all powerful regulators who may be subject to corruption and 
political and industry capture.  Empowering the market entails enforcing accurate and 
timely information disclosure and providing the right incentives for market participants to 
make sure they remain vigilant monitors – for example, through avoiding generous and 
mis-priced deposit insurance, or forbearance policies that distort risk-taking incentives.   
Research also questions the wisdom of transplanting First World practice to developing 
countries.  Often regulations considered appropriate in developed economies prove 
ineffective or counterproductive in weaker institutional settings:  Explicit deposit 
insurance may destabilize the very financial system it is meant to protect, and powerful 
supervisors may be more prone to corruption and extracting rents. Hence, the importance 
of institutional factors that need strengthening to support these policies. 
Finally, governments have an important role to play in facilitating broad access to 
financial services, i.e., in expanding the availability of the range of financial services to a 
broader set of households, firms and sectors in the economy.  A sure way of improving 
access is by making and encouraging infrastructure improvements.  Better legal, 
information, payments systems, distribution and other structures can allow technology to 
bring down transaction costs.  Promoting competition in the financial sector and allowing  
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foreign institutions will also encourage the private sector to reach the under-served 
segments and increase the speed with which access-improving technologies are adopted. 
Consumer protection rules such as anti-discrimination and anti-predatory lending 
regulations would help, and so would removal of interest ceilings that end up hurting the 
poor. Governments can also be instrumental in facilitating innovative technologies to 
improve access through private-public partnerships.    
Finally, while the general messages will be similar, the priorities and the extent to 
which financial sector needs improvement in each country will depend on initial 
conditions, with the reforms being the most challenging for low-income countries.  
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Table 1. Financial Indicators : Summary Statistics by Income Group 
 
Full Sample  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Private Credit / GDP  156       0.447         0.416    0.008         2.067  
Stock Market Capitalization  107       0.465         0.550    0.004         3.798  
Net Interest Margin  156       0.053         0.034    0.009         0.240  
M2 (mil. 2000 USD)  159   123,757      735,395         20   6,604,461 
Number of Loans per 1000 People  44     200.02        222.50      4.44        771.80 
Freedom Score - Banking & Finance  163          3.0              1.0        1.0             5.0  
          
          
High Income Countries  No. of Obs. Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Private Credit / GDP  37       0.997         0.379    0.294         2.067  
Stock Market Capitalization  36       0.885         0.688    0.098         3.798  
Net Interest Margin  45       0.025         0.009    0.009         0.051  
M2 (mil. 2000 USD)  23   676,638   1,820,871    3,423   6,604,461 
Number of Loans per 1000 People  10     450.50        247.99    48.75        753.98 
Freedom Score - Banking & Finance  37          2.3              0.9        1.0             3.5  
          
          
Upper Middle Income Countries  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Private Credit / GDP  32       0.442         0.316    0.101         1.306  
Stock Market Capitalization  25       0.374         0.395    0.019         1.470  
Net Interest Margin  28       0.053         0.029    0.018         0.150  
M2 (mil. 2000 USD)  35     25,293        37,628       112      162,953 
Number of Loans per 1000 People  11     251.81        211.23    53.85        771.80 
Freedom Score - Banking & Finance  29          2.6              0.9        1.0             5.0  
          
          
Lower Middle Income Countries  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Private Credit / GDP  40       0.307         0.207    0.029         1.018  
Stock Market Capitalization  30       0.213         0.214    0.005         0.844  
Net Interest Margin  41       0.062         0.028    0.011         0.127  
M2 (mil. 2000 USD)  48     58,545      294,801         72   2,045,992 
Number of Loans per 1000 People  18       74.41         54.00      4.44        249.60 
Freedom Score - Banking & Finance  46          3.2              0.9        1.5             5.0  
          
          
Low-Income Countries  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Private Credit / GDP  47       0.137         0.091    0.008         0.399  
Stock Market Capitalization  16       0.132         0.136    0.004         0.529  
Net Interest Margin  42       0.075         0.039    0.025         0.240  
M2 (mil. 2000 USD)  53       7,910        40,830         20      296,826 
Number of Loans per 1000 People  5       37.33         39.73      4.50         98.11  
Freedom Score - Banking & Finance  51          3.6              0.8        2.5             5.0   
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Figure 1. Private Credit / GDP 
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Source: Beck et. al. 2006. Financial Structure Database (The World Bank)






































4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00
Log of GDP per capita (2000 USD)
Sample size: 152 countries
Time period: 2000-2004 Avg.
Source: Beck et. al. 2006. Financial Structure Database (The World Bank)
  
  50
Figure 2. Stock Market Capitalization / GDP 
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Source: Beck et. al. 2006. Financial Structure Database (The World Bank)
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Source: Beck et. al. 2006. Financial Structure Database (The World Bank)
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Figure 3. Net Interest Margin 
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Source: Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2006) 
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Figure 4. Bank Loans per 1000 People 
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Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria. 2005. Reaching Out Dataset
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Figure 6. Banking and Finance Freedom Index 
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